TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
WP(40) 271	19 July 1940
JP(42) 502	15 May 1942
COS(43) 505 (0)	4 September 1943

The above-listed Cabinet document(s), which was/were enclosed on this file, has/have been removed and destroyed.

For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed _____ Date _____

MOST SECRET

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MOST SECRET

C/5175.

London.

24th December, 1943.

reports to me that at your meeting
olonel Nicholls stated that he was engaged
f a communication network for agents in
Europe which would provide for them an
red communication channels. I would point
hame is completed without consultation
nstitute a breach of standing arrangement
self, which is the subject of correspondence
r confirmation in June 1943.

restricts S.O.E. to the use of "a total
nnels in Western Europe to cover the whole
ts for transmitting to and receiving from
purposes the two contingent obligations
d that interference or embarrassment with
ous result, I must reserve the right to
in the number of channels", and as
and when S.O.E. require to increase the
the matter would be brought up to re-

fact that in the first instance, before
sion at all, I had to refer to the Foreign
onstitutional issue was at stake and also
ne, unless very carefully controlled, might
serious handicap to my own communications,
the danger of the lives of my agents abroad,
o compromise to the communications of other
t necessary to write to C/D asking that no
taken without consultation with me.

Yours/

MOST SECRET

S.III/3.

INDEXED

MOST SECRET

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MOST SECRET

C/175.

LONDON.

14th December, 1947.

Beamish-Perry reports to me that at your meeting on the 6th inst., Colonel Gilchrist states that he was engaged upon the planning of a communication network for agents in North-West Occupied Europe which would provide for not less than four hundred communication channels. I would point out that if this scheme is completed without consultation with me it would constitute a breach of standing agreement between C/D. and myself, which is the subject of correspondence in March 1947 and of confirmation in June 1947.

This agreement restricts S.O.E. to the use of "a total of seventy-five channels in Western Europe to cover the whole of their requirements for transmitting to and receiving from agents". It also imposes the two contingent obligations that "if it is found that interference or embarrassment with S.I.S. communications result, I must reserve the right to ask for a reduction in the number of channels", and an agreement that "if and when S.O.E. require to increase the number of channels the matter would be brought up for re-consideration".

In view of the fact that in the first instance, before making this concession at all, I had to refer to the Foreign Office because a constitutional issue was at stake and also that any such scheme, unless very carefully controlled, might result not only in serious handicap to my own communications, but an increase to the danger of the lives of my agents abroad and also in serious compromise to the communications of other Services, I find it necessary to write to C/D asking that no positive steps be taken without consultation with me.

For/

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For your private information, Lambier-Parry was informed by Nicholls outside the meeting that a first contingent of one hundred American army wireless operators, forming the advance guard of three hundred wireless operators, had just reported to him and were to be used to man wireless transmitting and receiving stations in this country. It would appear, therefore, that already measures are well advanced towards the project of a very large communications undertaking. Both in my own interest and that of the general war effort, I feel that this must be subjected to scrutiny.

I am therefore writing to F/D asking for a clarification of S.O.E. intentions and am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Loxley.

T. F. E. Cavendish-Bentinck, Esq., C.B.E.

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British Embassy,
LISBON.

S.III/3

INDEXED

MOST SECRET,
PERSONAL.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,
4th October, 1943.

A line in reply to your letter to me of the 18th September to let you know that I have had a word with Harry Sporborg of S.O.E. about the passing to you and to our friends' representative of any intelligence which their man may pick up in Lisbon.

Sporborg readily agreed that the right course was for their man to pass to our friends' representative any and all intelligence which he might be able to gather, and that if it was of any political significance it should be passed to you as well. He promised to look into the matter with the departments of S.O.E. concerned, and to have a suitable telegram sent to their man in Lisbon.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD) P.N.LOXLEY.

H.L.d'A. Hopkinson, Esq.,
British Embassy,
LISBON.

FOREIGN OFFICE.

MOST SECRET.

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British Embassy,

LISBON.

16th September, 1943.

MOST SECRET.

PERSONAL.

Dear Peter,

I am still far from satisfied in regard to the relations between S.I.S. and S.O.E. in Lisbon. On the surface everything is perfectly amicable, and so far as I know there are no personal difficulties. On the other hand I am constantly getting small pieces of evidence to show that in fact the two organisations are working almost independently of one another. I will give you an example. As you know, I am in intermittent touch with Pangal, the former Roumanian Cabinet Minister, who from time to time provides bits of information and who recently has been acting in some degree as contact with the satellite countries. Through him I recently received an enquiry from a Roumanian emissary in regard to the measures which Roumania would have to take to give effect to unconditional surrender. This was reported in my telegram to Moley Sargent No. 1649 of 11th September.

A day or so after the meeting with Pangal referred to above S.O.E.'s representative here brought me the enclosed report which, as you will see, corresponds very closely to my conversation with Pangal. It transpired that he had only brought this to me because his headquarters in London had sent him instructions to report to us any information obtained in regard to peace proposals. He then produced various other intelligence reports which also would normally only have gone to London. Now, apart from the fact that it has always been very clearly understood that S.O.E. is not an intelligence organisation and is not expected to go out of its way to obtain intelligence but only to report such information as may reach it in the course of its other functions, it seems to me wholly wrong that S.O.E.'s people here should be sending stuff home which they communicate neither to the diplomatic staff nor to C's representative.

I am writing to you about this because I feel that action can probably only be secured from above: in other words, that if I were to try to insist on S.O.E. showing me everything they send back and at the same time passing it to C's man it would probably result in our being told that their streams of information had dried up. I do not want to make a row over the thing because, as I say, personal relations are satisfactory, but I think that S.O.E.'s representative here should get a directive from his headquarters that all intelligence obtained is to be communicated to C's man, and that anything of political interest is to be shown to myself.

I do not wish to raise the question of whether S.O.E. intelligence should be collated here or in London. In the Middle East, as you probably know, the procedure is that S.O.E. turn in all their information to C's man, who then assesses it and reports it to London in whatever form he thinks best. Personally I think that would be the best system here also, but there may be considerations which render this impossible.

Yours ever,

Hugh Dalton

P. Loxley, Esq.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

SECRET

Form H.1.—February, 1932
(Revised November, 1939).

S.O.E. Liaison Arrangements.

MINUTE SHEET

ADSI - Liaison 4

CX

Source

No. 1008.

Date 7.9.43.

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C.S.S.

It is not easy to understand what is really proposed in paragraphs 7 to 13 of this paper. Paragraphs 8 and 9 seem definitely to propose that Intelligence messages of the highest importance received by S.O.E. will be sent to the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat by S.O.E., and paragraph 10 proposes that alternatively they may be passed direct to operations sections in the Service Ministries. Paragraph 12, however, states that messages dealing only with Intelligence will continue to be sent only to us.

2. Paragraph 11 is also vague, but it seems to suggest that we are to receive copies of the Intelligence reports which S.O.E. send to operations sections of Service Ministries, but not copies of those messages which S.O.E. deem of sufficient importance to send to the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat as proposed in paragraph 9.

3. On the assumption, however, that it is definitely proposed that S.O.E. should send Intelligence received by themselves direct either to the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat or operations sections of Service Ministries, I consider that we should strongly oppose the proposal. S.O.E. are in fact going infinitely further in this line than we do ourselves, for they apparently propose to cut out the Intelligence departments of the Service Ministries. My experience is that S.O.E. are utterly incapable of handling Intelligence and assessing what its importance may be. They have recently got wildly excited concerning the most fantastic reports from Denmark which suggested, inter alia, that Hitler was under arrest, and I am quite sure that under the proposed arrangement this is one of the reports that they would have decided to send direct to the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat. It would be dangerous from the point of view of a false value being placed on these Intelligence reports if S.O.E. were to cut us out and send them direct to Intelligence departments, but it would be infinitely more dangerous if the present proposals were adopted.

4. Also, if this arrangement were approved, I feel sure that S.O.E. would start creating a regular Intelligence department of their own. I suggest that we strongly oppose the suggestions which I understand are being made in paragraphs 7 to 13, and stand out for the present arrangements continuing unaltered.

ACTION PROPOSED

7. 9. 43

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Form K 1 —February 1932
(Revised November, 1939)

MINUTE SHEET.

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Source
No.
Date

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C.S.S.

I take grave objection to the proposals in paras. 7 - 13 of C.O.S.(43)505(O), as I think they will create the utmost confusion.

Para. 7. I have no remark to make.

Para. 8. Unfortunately intelligence received through S.O.E. sources has not always been sent to "C" only.

Para. 9. Whilst this can be done, of course, it is surely much better that the Chiefs of Staff should receive this information properly vetted by their Directors of Operations or Directors of Intelligence, as the case may be.

Para. 10. Were this to read that S.O.E. should be authorised to pass direct to the appropriate Operation Sections of the Service Ministries messages of an operational character, there would be little objection.

Paras. 11-12. Surely there is no real difficulty in differentiating between intelligence and operational messages. Where the message contains both, it is elementary that the Operation and the Intelligence Sections of a Staff should each receive a copy. Where it contains only operations it should go to the appropriate Operation Section of the Service Ministry concerned; where it contains intelligence it should go to S.I.S. and be distributed by the circulating sections to the intelligence sections of the Service Departments concerned, with appropriate comments, if any, in accordance with S.I.S.'s knowledge of the matter from other sources.

Such practice will avoid all the duplication and confusion that is likely to result from the proposals of the above paper, and will keep the whole procedure in accordance with what has hitherto been considered sound General Staff practice.

ACTION PROPOSED

6.9.43.

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Form 361—February, 1932
Revised November, 1939

MINUTE SHEET.

O.X.
Source
No.
Date

DISTRIBUTION

C.S.S.

1. I consider the proposals in paras: 7 to 13 of C.O.S. (43) 505 (O), which come under the heading of "S.O.E. Intelligence", are most undesirable.

2. If approved, the effect will be tantamount to setting up a new intelligence service, with all the duplication and confusion which that implies.

3. Para: 8 lays down that "messages of the highest importance" will be transmitted direct to the C.O.S. Secretariat, who will be responsible for giving them such further distribution as they consider necessary. There is no guarantee, therefore, that we shall see such messages.

4. The C.O.S. Secretariat is not, and does not purport to be, a body which is able to judge the significance or importance of a message, from either the operational or intelligence aspect. In effect, all the C.O.S. Secretariat will do is to hand on such messages to the Directors of Operations or Intelligence, or to the J.I.C. as a whole, and ask them to indicate what distribution these messages should receive, and what action, if any, is required. At this stage, the Directors of Operations or Intelligence may wish to consult us.

5. The effect of introducing another distributing authority or "post office", viz. the C.O.S. Secretariat, will merely be to cause more delay, before any action can be taken, than would have been the case if the messages had been sent straight to us and passed by us to the appropriate authority. In other words, just one more link in the chain.

6. A similar effect will be produced by the proposal in para: 10 that S.O.E. should pass messages of lesser importance direct to the "appropriate operations sections of the Service Ministries." If such messages are concerned, as seems likely, with events in foreign countries and the operations of foriegn guerilla forces or resistance groups, the operational sections in the service Ministries will want to pass them back to the intelligence sections in order to obtain their views. The intelligence sections may then wish to consult us. Hence there will be more delay than if they had been passed by us direct to the intelligence sections; also more duplication, because copies of these messages are apparently going to be passed through us as well.

ACTION PROPOSED

P.T.O.

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7. I do not think this system of distribution will appeal to the Directors of either Operations or Intelligence who will probably be the first to realise how much confusion and duplication it will entail.

8. As regards Annex "B", I understand that Air Commodore Thornton proposes to take exception to the arrangement whereby all liaison between S.O.E. and the Admiralty, irrespective of whether policy, plans, or administration are concerned, is through Admiral Taylor, whereas he, Thornton, is supposed to deal with the Air Ministry merely on questions of air policy, and not on questions effecting the planning of S.O.E. air operations, or those affecting the administration of S.O.E. air personnel. I anticipate that the Air Ministry will support him in this.

9. This is primarily a matter between the Air Ministry and S.O.E., but it also affects me when I find myself in the ridiculous position of discovering that a paper on air policy, which had apparently been agreed to by you, CD, Thornton, Boyle, Barry and Major General Gubbins has apparently been turned down again at the last moment because the latter has had second thoughts about it.

6.9.43.

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C.O.S. (43) 505 (O)

4 September 1943

[illegible]

[illegible] 3. [illegible] _ s/Plans.

=D/RP

MOST

b- [illegible]

AP,I , 838. 5. [illegible]

Ia: I/P .NS. [illegible]
Copies to [illegible] (I,) . [illegible]

Your [illegible] 1 of 4th March. The C.C.[illegible] decision to the overr[illegible] [illegible] of this work is re-affirmation of a [illegible] decision. I feel that there is very useful opportunity for us to [illegible] say [illegible] from the moral [illegible] of information [illegible] received.

[illegible] would be [illegible] [illegible] Repatriative [illegible] to agents in [illegible] part [illegible] could not covert [illegible] be like to [illegible] [illegible] not be any [illegible] section etc?

We shall try to concentrate in every possible way [illegible] say though I cannot expect our strength [illegible] infiltration plans [illegible] be carried. I [illegible] if [illegible] enough trained men or reporting [illegible].

MOST SECRET

C.C.S.(43) 33rd Meeting (O)

MOST SECRET

Pl/Ys/481/921 [illegible] March, 1943.

To: [illegible] From: /PLANS.
[illegible]/P, [illegible]/1.

[illegible] NATIONS
LACK [illegible] INTELLIGENCE.

1. [illegible] told me yesterday that this decision had been taken in the [illegible], and I said that [illegible] of course [illegible] intelligence we obtain, [illegible] such use of it as he thou[illegible].

2. You may consider it worthwhile [illegible] priority allotted by the Chiefs of Staff obtains, we should do all we can to obtain information of take [illegible].

3. I am not sure whether this activity would [illegible] to [illegible]. We ought per[illegible] to ask him first of all whether he requires our cooperation.

4. The sooner the information required has been obtained the sooner will the priority accorded to int- [illegible]

of C.C.S.

[illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible] concerning [illegible] to [illegible] such [illegible]

[illegible] action

[illegible] of view of [illegible] the [illegible] "[illegible]" [illegible] Europe were

[illegible]

/PLANS.

[illegible]

[illegible] D/Ops/[illegible] [illegible] D/Plans.

MOST SECRET

C.O.S.(43) 55rd Meeting (C)

Extract from Minutes of Meeting of C.O.S.

held on 3rd March, 1943 at 10.30 a.m.

Item 3. [illegible]

[illegible] importance of [illegible] concerning [illegible] particular [illegible]

[illegible] Committee [illegible]

[illegible]

Agreed that, from the point of view of the effective execution of the war, "[illegible]" requirements in North West Europe were over-riding.

D/PLANS.

Distribution:

DCD(O)
AD/P
AD/S

31 JAN 1945

PLANS/150/771.

30th January, 1945.

To: C.D. through [illegible].
Copy to: [illegible]

From: D/PLANS.

1. We have been shown a copy of a tele ram from Field Marshal Savell to the Chiefs of Staff, the gist of which is as follows:-

'1. Investigating feasibility of (a) better information and (b) anti-Japanese activity in Northern Sumatra.

2. Both projects made difficult by lack of transport particularly submarines and shortage of suitable personnel. In view of shortage of both consider S.O.E. and S.I.S. would pool resources for this neighbourhood and ask Chiefs of these organisations should issue appropriate orders.

3. Consider Dutch authorities London should know of my projects. Will do nothing without consulting Dutchmen here.'

2. It is possible that the C.O.S. may consider this telegram on Monday morning the 1st February, and in order that C.I.G.S. may be briefed as to our reactions, I have, after our discussion this afternoon by telephone, informed Major Dutch that we would welcome Field Marshal Savell's proposal.

3. We have after all set the precedent in East Africa in regard to personnel, and we virtually share S.O.E. and S.I.S. aircraft for transport operations from this country.

D/PLANS.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(a) [illegible]

(b) [illegible]

(c) [illegible]

(d) [illegible]

(e) [illegible]

(f) [illegible]

Reference

bury, and indeed.

D D 1856

[illegible]

[illegible] 4th [illegible], 1987.

[illegible]

([illegible])

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

2. [illegible] importance of [illegible] preparation of the peoples of Europe, [illegible] subject [illegible] over-[illegible] long [illegible] accept [illegible] government, [illegible] advisers, [illegible] which [illegible] [illegible] national [illegible] for the common [illegible] covered by [illegible].

3. [illegible] work in close collaboration [illegible] stage, [illegible] of [illegible], [illegible] to [illegible] overall plan.

4. [illegible] believe [illegible] to [illegible] activities [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible].

5. [illegible] should [illegible] continue to [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Signed C. C. HOLMES

Dear

Carbonate to [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Dear

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T P (72) . 20
. 14, 9 7 2

L/XX/725 PERSONAL 3.5.43.

To: C.L. From: L

High Level Conciliator: S.I.S./S.O.E.

Reference your CD/OR/1714 dated 30.4.43

The principal subjects of discussion between ourselves and the S.I.S. fall under the following broad headings -

(a) Recruitment and selection of agents, especially where the field of recruitment is limited.

(b) Priorities for air and sea transport for the field.

(c)

(d) Provision of documents, especially where their capture might allegedly incriminate "S" agents

(e) Use of and courier's passports for our representatives abroad.

(f) Sharing agents in the field.

(g) Communications with the field, especially radio.

There are also two major questions which are constant sources of difficulty.

Firstly, the diametric difference in our work, which is active as opposed to "S" s which is passive, and the fact that, on the whole, we must "get on with the business" and take the normal risks of war, whereas "S" employs a more defensive technique.

The second question is a matter

(a) of the distribution of intelligence which we receive from abroad, and of

(b) the access by our officers to intelligence at "S" disposal which we urgently need for our operations.

Neither of these are, in my opinion, at present satisfactorily dealt with.

In my opinion, the work of the proposed conciliator will comprise, firstly, arbitration over small matters of detail, such as those enumerated in para. 1 above and none the less important since, if a deadlock is reached in any of these trivial matters, it may, in fact, paralyse a further important project. His second duty will be [illegible] the weight and voice to the war effort [illegible] S.O.E. operation which has [illegible] organised [illegible].

I therefore warmly approve your description that the conciliator's office should resemble a judicial body, and I agree that it is most important that the facts on both sides upon which the conciliator's ruling is to be obtained should be proved, and called before they are submitted. I do feel however, since a great many of the cases where arbitration is required

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is required will concern technical details, that the officers of S.O.E. and S.I.S. who are concerned, no matter on what level they may be working, should be allowed to present their case themselves and, furthermore, that experts should be available from both sides to give an opinion where required.

5. The picture I therefore have in my own mind is of a small committee consisting of Sir Findlater Stewart in the chair with S.O.E.'s representative and "C"'s representative also present each of whom will be responsible for ensuring, in the first instance, that the case in question is of sufficient importance to require high level arbitration.

6. Regarding S.O.E.'s representative on the committee, I think this is for yourself to decide and I will naturally abide by your decision. S.O.E.'s representative must, however, have the need for "action" as opposed to "intelligence" constantly in mind, and must push our case in that sense. In my own appointment here as head of the Operations Directorate I have constantly before me the Chiefs of Staff's directive for "action", and the fact that one day, and soon, they will demand results; and yet on the other hand I am constantly baulked and handicapped by the alleged demands of Intelligence. I have spent five years myself in Intelligence (at the War Office and G.H.Q., India) and know something about its methods.

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From C D

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

4th Nov 1942.

that

[illegible]

From C.D

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

24th Mar. 1942.

is required will concern technical details, that the officers of S.[illegible], and S.I.S. who are concerned, no matter on what level they may be working, should be allowed to present their case themselves and, furthermore, that experts should be available from both sides to give an opinion where required.

The picture I therefore have in my own mind is of a [illegible] of Sir Findlater Stewart in the [illegible]

From C.D.

Ma[illegible] Con[illegible]

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

4th May, 1942.

My dear Sir Findlater,

The Foreign Secretary has [illegible] the terms of Reference of the Liaison Committee, and I hereby enclose them.

He agrees with us that it would be very desirable that the Committee should meet as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Sir Findlater Stewart, K.C.B., K.C.I.E.,

From C

Copies

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] as [illegible] is certain in this [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

do not agree that
the Conciliator a

D[illegible] T[illegible] letter from [illegible] to [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ry of [illegible] warfare,
[illegible] ar [illegible] ware [illegible]

[illegible]

DRAFT letter from [illegible] to [illegible]

(Personal [illegible])

[illegible] SECRET

[illegible] of [illegible] Kennedy [illegible]

DRAFT letter from [illegible] to [illegible]

(Original on file [illegible] F/1234 [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
[illegible] London, W.1.

[illegible] April, 1942.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have heard from Major Morton to-day that you have directed my report on S.O.E. to be printed and circulated to the War Cabinet and to the Defence Committee. I am very glad you have done this, and thank you most sincerely.

Morton, however, tells me that you do not favour the appointment of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross to conduct the enquiry proposed by me, but that you favour the appointment of Mr. Justice Singleton instead.

On this matter I make two chief recommendations in my report:-

(1) A review of the organisation of S.O.E. and the conditions under which it has to work, by an experienced and qualified person. This should take a comparatively short time.

(2)

(2) The appointment of a Conciliator as Chairman of the Liaison Committee between G. and [illegible]

It seems to me that Mr. Justice Singleton would be an excellent selection for the second of these two functions. The Foreign Secretary has now agreed that such a Liaison Committee and Conciliator shall be appointed and it is merely a question of finding a suitable Conciliator. I have not suggested Singleton's name to him, but so far as I am concerned he would be most acceptable. I believe that his knowledge of African conditions and complete impartiality would enable him to smooth out the frictions that exist, and are bound to arise from day to day, between G. and S.O.E. This is a work of great importance as the present lack of harmony between the two organizations is a source of grave danger to very brave men. In fact, I go so far as to say that neither G. nor S.O.E. can function with the greatest efficiency unless complete co-ordination and collaboration is achieved, and if Mr. Justice Singleton can [illegible] time for this very important work, I believe he would succeed admirably in it.

Dr/

D R A F T letter from M I 15 Bn to [illegible]

Original on 1/[illegible] F/134 [illegible]

3

On the other hand it does not seem to me that Singleton's experience is of the sort that necessitates for the review of the organisation of S.O.E. The case for such a review may be summarised as follows:-

(a) S.O.E. has been carrying out work of such a secret nature that its conduct can never be discussed in Parliament nor can it be examined by the Public Accounts Committee.

(b) A number of adverse criticisms from its staff for inefficiency have spread alarmed rumours which have reached the highest circles.

(c) S.O.E. is run by a body of very able and well-known men who have undertaken the work from motives of patriotism, but whose official reputations are involved. It is necessary, in fairness to them, and also in the public interest, that someone who has had experience in the administration of Government departments should be able to certify either that the organisation is all that it should be, or that it could be improved in this respect or that.

TW

It does not seem to me that Mr. Justice Kingston's experience has lain in the field of administration, and a suggestion made by him in regard to office organization, [illegible] would not be of anything like the value of one made by a leading Civil Servant or political administrator.

Furthermore, if it became known (and these things apparently have a most deplorable and shocking capacity for becoming known) that you had appointed a Judge of the High Court to enquire into S.G.E., the inference that most people who knew [illegible] would draw, would be that some criminal offence had been alleged. The result on the reputations of the very prominent men of business, lawyers, soldiers, and civil servants who have worked so well at this task would be such as I could not expect them to tolerate. I anticipate that I would be faced with large scale resignations on the part of key men, with disastrous results on the efficiency of S.G.E.

For these reasons I hope very much you will decide not to [illegible] appointing a leading Civil Servant or political administrator to make the review of the organisation and conditions, while I would/

D R . F T letter from M L S Eh to Prof H [illegible]

(* [illegible] F/[illegible] F/12[illegible]

5

would welcome the appointment of Mr. Justice Singleton in the really [illegible] work of Conciliator between the two Secret Service organisations.

If you have [illegible] in this course, I should be grateful if you would [illegible]. The matter is urgent because this delay is [illegible] among the key men.

I [illegible] for your information that Sir Frank Nelson (Administration [illegible] of M.O.I.) is [illegible] to resign on account of ill health. He has a duodenal ulcer and is suffering also from [illegible] to key [illegible] on [illegible] to occupy his place. I do care [illegible] changes that will improve efficiency.

Yours sincerely,

The Rt. Hon. [illegible] Churchill, C.H., M.P.,
10, Downing Street,
[illegible] S.W.1.

[illegible] letter from [illegible] to [illegible]

(Original on file F/134.1)

Copy to ATS?
MS

F/134.1

In conference by the S.P.O. who were responsible for the design of the station;
following [illegible]

by the [illegible]
the erection of [illegible]

[illegible] was given us to
they will [illegible] no objections to offer.

Finally I do not [illegible]

[illegible] T letter from [illegible] to [illegible]

[illegible] 1/12 F/134 1

CONFIDENTIAL

D[illegible] T letter from [illegible] to [illegible]

[illegible] F/134 [illegible]

COPY

Foreign Office,

[illegible] 1.

[illegible]th [illegible]ril, 194[illegible].

Dear Gladwyn,

[illegible] reference to our [illegible]versation on the telephone t[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] effective [illegible] [illegible] minute to the Secretary [illegible] about [illegible] with your Minister the [illegible] before last.

"I h[illegible] [illegible] home after dinner tonight. He is quite willing that you should [illegible] the responsibility for [illegible] activities in neutral countries and will take your direction about them. I [illegible] will see [illegible] [illegible] arrangement with him about this.

[illegible] regard to activities in enemy countries, it is [illegible] that [illegible] and [illegible] should [illegible] in the closest harmony. I [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] to the friction [illegible] between the two branches. [illegible] must of course be [illegible] [illegible] wish to be.

Elmhorne tells me he is quite ready to have an investigation into his Department as he [illegible] it is [illegible] it."

The Secretary of State is of course quite willing to [illegible] [illegible] the above to your [illegible]. In [illegible] [illegible] be the "[illegible]" [illegible] we have on the [illegible].

Yours ever,

[illegible]

Gladwyn Jebb, [illegible]
[illegible]

DRAFT letter from [illegible] to [illegible]

In the copy

Copy [illegible]

SECRET

D R A F T letter from AJ JS NR to [illegible]

[illegible]

D R A F T letter from MLIS BR to [illegible]

D R A F T letter from LIONS Rd to RUSSIA CONTRACT

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] letter from [illegible] to [illegible]

My dear Anthony:

[illegible]

[illegible] letter from just [illegible]

[illegible] the matter [illegible]

Yours ever,

[illegible]

[illegible] letter from [illegible] to [illegible]

My dear Anthony

S.I. and [illegible]

Reference [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Day,

[illegible] I

[illegible] let

[illegible] se

[illegible] r

[illegible] to

[illegible] te

[illegible] t

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

D R A F T letter from M.I.5 to Major Desmond Morton

My dear Anthony,

S.I.S. and S.C.E.

As I think you are aware, the Prime Minister, when appointing me, asked me to make a careful investigation of the work of S.C.E. and I propose to report to him very shortly. One feature of what I have found worries me considerably, and that is the ~~worse~~ friction that exists between S.C.E. and S.I.S. I accordingly asked Sir Frank Nelson for a candid statement to be given to me of the difficulties he had to complain of in regard to S.I.S. I gathered from you, in our conversation ~~the day~~ that you were unaware of this, and I accordingly enclose Sir Frank's statement (which was intended only for my own eyes) together with covering note by Mr. Jebb.

These documents reveal a [illegible] to me. I [illegible] that [illegible] S.I.S. [illegible] doubt that [illegible] S.I.S. for [illegible] if they were [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] S.C.E.

on [illegible] the fact that the production [illegible] and I [illegible] most [illegible] could be graduated. To my mind it is not that any one individual is to blame. It is that the system needs some ~~[illegible]~~ adjustment to meet the present circumstances.

It must be remembered that S.O.E. [illegible] toadstool or [illegible] which was run in [illegible] the war and has been used with the greatest energy by those who were responsible for its [illegible] task. They were ~~held responsible for organising~~ and [illegible] sabotage in every enemy-occupied territory, - in the prime Minister's words, to "set Europe ablaze". ~~In pursuance of this~~ To this end the [illegible] have trained and dispatched as many agents as possible and we now ~~nearly two~~ about 500 ~~hundred and fifty men~~ The human [illegible] "in the field. ~~They have sent them not only in to enemy-occupied territories~~ but also, and in my view [illegible] to territories that have not ~~yet~~ been placed in the enemy that which ~~are in danger of being so occupied.~~ [illegible] these agents S.O.E. endeavour to create [illegible] wireless [illegible] other communications, ~~and the number of agents is growing and will grow.~~ It results from this that a great [illegible] organisation is set up by these agents, [illegible] which is transmitted through

from his name [illegible] much

.1.8

S.I.S. For some territories more information is naturally received from S.O.E than from S.I.S agents because they happen to be more numerous in that country. For instance, for some months past we have had four agents working in Madagascar whilst there was continuous wireless communication as been maintained with areas I am informed that S.I.S have no agent there in consequence, the Services are getting all their information in regard to Madagascar from S.O.E.

There is, therefore, an inevitable overlap between S.O.E and S.I.S which means that the two Services must work in harmony. Up till now this has been attempted by the methods described in the enclosed documents, particularly by means of the weekly meeting between the administrative heads of S.O.E and S.I.S. It is because it is stated that it is felling so badly that it seems to me to be necessary that there should be [illegible] the course [illegible] I suggested that [illegible] to S[illegible] the other day as [illegible] of the heads of S.I.S [illegible] S.O.E [illegible] over [illegible] Co-ordinator. [illegible]

[illegible] parties, ~~and I mentioned the name of Lord Swinton as an example.~~ It would, of course, follow that if in the event of any dispute either side was able to get the Government or [illegible] the matter should be referred to a ministerial level; [illegible] the Government [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

Copy to all Members of Council.

C/9029

LO [illegible]

[illegible] 1 [illegible]

Copy to all Members of Council.
CL, F, L, 7

LO [illegible]

27 MAR 1949

[illegible]

Dear C.S.S.

[illegible]

[illegible] for your letter of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Copy to all Members of Council.

MOST SECRET

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

[illegible] 1942

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(Signed) C. D.

Copy to all Members of Council.

MOST SECRET

Reference _____

[illegible]

(Signed) C. D.

Copy to all Members of Council.

MOST SECRET

Reference

[illegible]

S.O. [illegible] S.C.E.

In one [illegible] recent [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

C.D.

[illegible]

Signed) C. D.

Copy to all Members of Council

MOST SECRET

[illegible]/10/1 [illegible] 1st March 19[illegible]

Dear C.S.S.,

Communications.

[illegible] refer to our conversation yesterday [illegible] in the case of [illegible] our [illegible] in the case of [illegible] to our [illegible] operations in this country.

They are as follows:-

1. [illegible] wish to translate and receive from agents -

(a) In respect of what [illegible] "military operations" [illegible]

[illegible] we are [illegible] to

( ) In respect of what [illegible] "[illegible]".

[illegible] is working with [illegible] or [illegible] operations [illegible].

In this connection Colonel [illegible] are made to [illegible] operations "[illegible]".

To meet this point I suggested that we should [illegible] ourselves or to [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] as we [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] required [illegible] as [illegible] [illegible] as [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

2. It was understood that we [illegible] to [illegible] "[illegible]" [illegible] our requirements [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] I explained [illegible]

Signed) C. D

F/134·1
M

MOST SECRET

W/XI/4 MOST SECRET 10.3.42.

To: C.D. From: W

1. AD/E's note attached covers satisfactorily the general relations between our Country Sections and 'C', and the difficulties that have been experienced in the past. A year ago we were looked upon as rather inefficient and ridiculous collection of amateurs who might endanger S.I.S. if we were not kept quiet. The general attitude on a high level now appears to be that we are very dangerous rivals and that, if we are not squashed quickly, we will squash them. The change in attitude is due entirely to the fact that we have outstripped them in many directions, have proved ourselves on the whole more hardworking and enthusiastic, and that we are not afraid of challenging them when they try to double-cross us.

2. Now, however, the majority of 'C's' Country Sections and also their Transport Sections realise that we can help them very much and that on the whole it would be better for their own advantage to play with us. But there is still in the higher circles no real attempt at collaboration at all, and pin-prick efforts are continuously made to hamper our work, both as regards intelligence, communications, relations with Allied Governments, etc.

3. You will note that the French and Belgian Sections have not got many definite instances. There have been large changes in these Sections recently and they are not fully aware of concrete instances of trouble that have occurred in the past.

4. I have attached the full story of the Stockholm 'improvise' which was discussed at length in the presence of 'C', D/CD, and the First Secretary of H.M.'s Legation at Stockholm, as it is an obvious instance of the methods by which 'C's' organisation try to deride us and get us into difficulties.

F/134-1
M

NOTE ONLY

From G.D. GD/GX/1160

To All Members of Council. 8th March 1943.

S. I. R.

1. S.O. has asked us to compile for him a statement which will show clearly, but dispassionately, why our relations with S.I.R. have been so consistently bad and are definitely deteriorating at the present time.

2. I suggest that this be broken up into the following parts:-

(a) Agents and Operations - to be compiled by M., with the assistance of his Regional Heads.

(b) Intelligence - to be compiled by AD/P.

(c) Communications - to be compiled by AD/X.

3. A certain number of instances in which there is definite evidence of "suppressio veri" or definite mis-statements should be appended; but generally it should be in narrative form with the "leit-motif" being that the word "co-operation" is usually interpreted by S. as one way traffic, i.e. from us to them.

4. When I have received the various papers, which I should like to have during Monday next, I will write a foreword myself, linking them all together and tracing the whole history from August 1940 to date.

5. May this please be treated as urgent and extremely important, and I would ask all Members of the Council to give their personal attention to see that I get the best type of memorandum in the circumstances - for much depends upon making this case.

6. Any Members who are not specified as in paragraph 2 above should not consider themselves debarred from contributing to this if they have any outstanding instances or episodes which would support this case.

G. D.

MINUTE

Minute.

I attach a minute by C.D. covering a memorandum on our relations with the S.O.E. It all makes regrettable reading and I feel it incumbent on me both to tell you what I feel myself and to make suggestions as to how the existing state of affairs could best be remedied. Perhaps I had better start with a brief history of our relations with S.O.E. up to date, so far as machinery is concerned.

In his original Charter, attached at Flag A., Mr. Dalton was instructed to "co-ordinate" the activities of various bodies, one of which was the "sabotage service", alternatively known as the "D" section of the S.O.E., the administrative authority of which was, at that time, the Foreign Office. Para. 4 (e) of Mr. Dalton's Charter laid it down that -

> "The various departments and bodies taking part in underground activities will, for the time being, continue to be administered by the Ministers at present responsible for them."

Subsequently, however, Mr. Dalton suggested to Lord Halifax that the only way to achieve efficiency was for him to administer the "D" section himself, and Lord Halifax agreed to Mr. Dalton's proposal in a letter dated the 15th August, 1940, a copy of which is attached at Flag B. You will see that this letter is entirely categorical and places the "D" section under the control of Mr. Dalton without any reserves.

As a result of this it became obvious that the spheres of "C" and "D" must be defined on paper and I therefore drafted, and got the C.O.S. to agree to a document, dated the 15th September, 1940, a copy of which is attached at Flag C. (I should add that it was after the signing of this document that we decided that the whole of Mr. Dalton's

new organisation should be known as S.O.E., and that for administrative purposes it should be divided up into S.O.1. - subversive propaganda - and S.O.2. - all other subversive activities.)

On the whole, my agreement with "C" has stood the test of time, but it has already - with "C"'s consent - been modified in certain important respects. Thus the "D Board" (which subsequently became the S.O.E. Board") was found, after a period of several months, to be too cumbersome, and with the rapid expansion of S.O.E., was replaced by a system of close liaison between S.O.E. and the various departments, including "C", with whom they came most into contact. So far as "C" was concerned, this meant, in practice, that C.D. and I went to see the C.S.S. once a week and communicated to him in advance (and to the A.C.S.S.) our internal Progress Report which is seen by no-one else outside our organisation and contains details of all our activities. A.C.S.S. also was invited to attend meetings of our "Council" - which replaced, for internal purposes, the old "S.O.2 Board" - and came occasionally, though this practice now seems to have lapsed. In any case, there was not the faintest attempt on our part to hide any of our activities or projects from "C": on the contrary, we made every effort to bring him in and to see that the two organisations should work in the closest possible co-operation.

The agreement of the 15th September, 1940, has also been modified in regard to communications in that we now handle our "main line" traffic ourselves (i.e. Telegrams to our own representatives abroad) and have in addition the right to organise our own W/T communications with agents in the field who are dependent on centres other than London (i.e. Middle East). We have now formally requested "C" to also agree to a

complete-